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Abstract
Policy makers focus on stable strategies as the ones adopted by rational players.
If there are many stable solutions, however, an important secondary question is how
to select amongst them. We study this question for the multicommodity flow coalition
game, introduced by Papadimitriou to model incentives and cooperation between au-
tonomous systems in the Internet. In short, the strategies of the game are flows in
a capacitated network (the supply graph). The payoff to any node is the total flow
which it terminates. Markakis-Saberi show that this game is balanced and hence has a
non-empty core by Scarf’s Theorem. In the transferable utility (TU) version this also
leads to a polynomial-time algorithm to find core elements but for the application to
autonomous systems, side payments are not natural. Finding core elements in NTU
games, however, tends to be computationally much more difficult, cf. [CS06]. Even
for this multiflow game, the only previous result is due to Yamada and Karasawa who
give a procedure to find a core element when the supply graph is a path. We extend
their work by designing an algorithm, called incorporate, which produces many
different core elements.
We use our algorithm to evaluate several specific instances by running incorpo-
rate to generate multiple core vectors. We call these the empirical core of the game.
We find that sampled core vectors are more consistent with respect to social welfare
(SW) than for fairness (minimum payout). For SW they tend to do as well as the
optimal linear program value LPsw. In contrast, there is a larger range across fairness
in the empirical core; the fairness values tend to be worse than the optimal fairness
LP value LPfair. We study this discrepancy in the setting of general graphs with
single-sink demands. In this setting we give an algorithm which produces core vectors
that simultaneously maximize SW and fairness. This leads to the following bicriteria
result for general games. Given any core-producing algorithm and any λ ∈ (0, 1), one
can produce an approximate core vector with fairness (resp. social welfare) at least
λLPfair (resp. (1− λ)LPsw).
1 Introduction
1.1 Coalition Games
A (non-transferrable) coalition game consists of a set of players N and a characteristic
function Π which maps each S ⊆ N to a subset of RN . The interpretation is that Π(S)
denotes the set of possible payoff (or utility) vectors pi available to players of S if they
decide to cooperate (we assume that pii = 0 if i 6∈ S). A general theme in cooperative
game theory is to find strategies whereby the grand coalition, namely N itself, becomes a
stable set of partners. In other words, we seek a payoff vector pi ∈ Π(N) which has no
breakaway set, that is a proper subset S of the players who could do better if they deviate
from a grand coalition strategy which produces pi. We now define this formally.
For two vectors x, y ∈ RN , we say x dominates y on S if xi > yi ∀i ∈ S; we write
x S y. Let S be a proper subset of N and pi ∈ Π(N). We call a second payoff vector
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pi′ ∈ Π(S) an S-deviation from pi if pi′ S pi; we also refer to the strategies inducing this
payoff as a deviation. We call S a breakaway set of pi if there is some S-deviation.
The core of a coalition game is the set of vectors pi ∈ Π(N) which have no breakaway
sets. Thus core vectors represent payoffs pi to the grand coalition which are stable in the
sense that no subset of players is motivated to defect from the strategies which induce pi.
Core vectors are the idealized outcomes of rational play in a coalition game, but what
role can they play in practice? Given that there may be many payoff vectors in the core,
Q1. which ones are preferable and hence should be incentivized? In a game without side
payments it becomes essential to understand payouts for individual players. We develop
theory in order to produce a large number of core vectors for an (NTU) multi-flow game.
This allows one to sample from the associated empirical core in order to compare core
vectors with respect to social welfare, fairness and other performance metrics.
1.2 The Multiflow Coalition Game
The players in a multicommodity flow coalition game consist of the nodes in a given supply
graph G = (V,E); we refer to e ∈ E as a supply edge. In addition, we are given capacities
cv on each node v ∈ V . We are also given a commodity graph H = (V, F ). We refer to
e ∈ F as a commodity edge; each such edge has an associated demand de ≥ 0.
Strategies in a flow coalition game arise from feasible flows in G for the commodities
H. For each commodity uv ∈ F , we denote by Puv the set of (simple) paths in G joining
u and v; P denotes the set of all simple paths. A flow is then defined by a non-negative
assignment of flow fP to each path P joining the endpoints of some commodity. Formally,
f is a feasible flow if it satisfies:
1.
∑
P3v fP ≤ cv ∀v ∈ V Capacity constraint
2.
∑
P∈Puv fP ≤ duv ∀uv ∈ F = E(H) Demand constraint
3. fP ≥ 0, P ∈ P.
We let F(G, c, d) denote the set of all feasible flows. We are also interested in the
strategies available to a subset S of players. We denote by F(G[S], c, d), or simply FS ,
the feasible flows in G[S], the subgraph of G induced by S.
Each feasible flow induces payoffs (or utilities) for the players as follows. For any
S ⊆ V , f ∈ FS , and v ∈ V we define piv(f) =
∑
wv∈E(H) fwv as the sum of all flows
that terminate at v (we make no distinction between traffic coming from or going to v).
Note that if v 6∈ S, then piv(f) = 0. The set of payoffs available to a coalition is thus
Π(S) = {pi(f) : f ∈ FS}. Given that the set of feasible flows is convex and that the utility
function is linear, Π(S) also defines a convex polyhedron.
1/2 0/2
1/1 0/2 1/1
Figure 1: A feasible flow for capacity vector (∞, 2, 2,∞) with a resulting utility vector
(2, 1, 2, 1). Case analysis shows that this, and the vector (1, 2, 1, 2) are in the core, but
the convex combination (32 ,
3
2 ,
3
2 ,
3
2) is not. f/d indicates the flow f and demand d for a
commodity edge.
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In order to study question Q1, one needs a method to produce multiple core vectors.
Unfortunately, for NTU games, there is no general method to (efficiently) compute even
one! A main computational stumbling block is that the core need not be convex (even
for multiflow games, see Figure 1.2) and hence standard optimization techniques are not
immediately forthcoming. To date, the only positive result [YK06] is one that exhibits a
core vector in the case when G is a path.
We design a simple polynomial-time algorithm which produces many core vectors when
the supply graph is a path. We then apply our method to several games and compare the
payoff vectors which are generated, called the empirical core. In Section 4 we present our
findings. A key takeaway is: in terms of social welfare, one doesn’t go far wrong using any
core element. In terms of fairness, however, there can be a 50% gap between the average
core vector and the maximum core vector fairness.
In the next section we outline the technical plan for designing and analyzing our new
algorithm.
1.3 A Method for Computing (Many) Core Vectors
In [YK06] it is proved that the following simple greedy procedure produces a vector in
the core of the multi-flow game when the supply graph G is a path 123 . . . n. That is,
V (G) = [n] and there exist edges i(i+ 1) for each i < n. They process the nodes from “left
to right” (i.e., from smallest to largest). We call this the YK algorithm. We denote this
graph by Pn. For each node i, they then scan its incident demand edges ij from largest j
to smallest. In scanning a demand ij they route as much flow as possible on the (unique)
path Pij joining i and j. They then decrement node capacities accordingly. We refer to
this as the core vector resulting from a left-right scan.1 As we also run a type of greedy
algorithm, we formalize the routing subroutine as follows.
Route
Input. A supply graph Pn with node capacities (Cv : v ∈ P ), and a subpath Pk`
m← minv∈Pk`
{
Cv
}
fk` ← min
{
dk`,m
}
Cv ← Cv − fk` ∀v ∈ Pk`
Here we use shorthand fk` to denote the flow variable fPk` . Hence we route as much flow
for a commodity k` as possible, i.e., the minimum of the smallest residual capacity on Pk`
and the demand dk`.
One property of the order in which commodities are processed in the yk algorithm
is that if [k`] ⊂ [ij], then k` is processed before ij. We call this a nested ordering. It is
not the case that greedily routing flows in a nested order is sufficient to produce a core
vector. The first flow in Figure 2 is produced by a nested ordering, and the second shows
a breakaway set (the middle 4 nodes).
In some sense, the issue in this example is that we grow two “islands” of flows (the left
and right ends of the paths) but the internal section formed a breakaway. To address this
issue we seek nested orderings which are gown in a contiguous fashion. We build a flow
iteratively starting from any node and then incorporating nodes one by one, enforcing the
incorporated nodes to induce a connected subgraph. We now present our algorithm for an
1The article [YK06] also refers to an extension to a special class of trees called spiders.
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Figure 2: Greedy nested ordering is not sufficient to create core vectors.
arbitrary connected supply graph G.
incorporate
Input. Given a Game (G,c,H,d), starting node r
Output. a flow f such that pi(f) ∈ Core(G, c,H, d)
f ← 0, S ← {r}, (Cv ← cv : v ∈ V (G))
while S ⊂ V do
Let v ∈ N(S)
Let T be a stack with elements of S in increasing order by distance from v
S ← S + v
while T 6= ∅ do
k ← Pop(T )
if kv ∈ E(H[S]) then
route
(
Pkv
)
end
end
end
Return f
When a player v is incorporated we route all the commodities incident to that player
whose other end point u is already incorporated. We do this to respect a nested ordering,
i.e., we process nodes u closer to v first. The terminology is especially fitting as both
"incorporate" and "core" etymologically derive from the Latin corpus. The proof of our
main theorems shows that at any point in the execution of the algorithm, the current flow
is in the core of the sub-game for the incorporated set.
Theorem 1. If G is a path, then incorporate returns a flow whose payoff vector is in
the core.
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We prove Theorem 1 in two main steps. In Section 2 we give a class of certificates. For
a given flow f and proper subset S ⊆ V either S has a deviation, or one of our certificates
guarantees that S is not a breakaway set for the payoffs of f . These arguments are based
on duality for LPs with strict inequalities. The results apply to general supply graphs.
In Section 3 we specialize the structure of these certificates to supply graphs which are
paths. We then use this structure to show that for any output of incorporate and any
S, we can produce such a certificate.
In [YK06] it is reported that their approach extends to supply graphs which are spiders,
although an argument is not provided. In Section 3 we show how to use incorporate to
derive an algorithm for finding core vectors in spiders.
Corollary 1. Let Tc be the class of trees (so-called spiders) with at most 1 node of degree
greater than two. There is a polytime algorithm for producing core elements for any multi-
flow game associated with a tree in Tc.
1.4 The Empirical Core and Improving Fairness
In Section 4 we leverage our main algorithmic result. We generate an array of games
based on different demand models. For each game, we can run incorporate from any
starting node and incorporate nodes in any (valid) order. This produces a large number of
distinct core elements. We call this set of samples the empirical core and we explore their
properties. Two of the most prominent features are:
• Observation 1. Sampled core payoffs have social welfare which is very close to the
theoretical optimum,
• Observation 2. There is a wide range on fairness (minimum payoff) amongst the
sampled core payoffs,
thus suggesting that incentives are required in order to achieve both the maximum social
welfare and fairness.
There is one setting where it is possible to balance the competing objectives of social
welfare and fairness exactly. That is, we can find a core solution which achieves both
the optimal fairness and social welfare. Instead of restricting the supply graph (to trees
or spiders), we allow general supply graphs but restrict the topology of the commodity
graph. In this vein, it becomes illuminating to consider the class of single-sink commodity
graphs, where all commodities are incident to a “root” node t. We can associate each such
commodity with terminals si ∈ V (G) and demand di, i = 1, 2, 3 . . . k. A payoff vector can
be viewed as x ∈ R[k]≥0 for which there is a feasible flow that routes xi flow from each si to t;
the payoff to each i is xi and to t it is
∑
i xi. It easily follows that any x which maximizes∑
i xi is a core element. This is because any breakaway set must contain t, and it already
achieves its maximum utility (globally content in our parlance).
We use the standard LPs to study the quality of our core vectors. For instance, the
fairness LP for a multiflow game consists of the standard formulation together with a
parameter τ ≥ 0 with the following constraints∑
j
fij ≥ τ for each i.
If this LP is feasible we say the instance has fairness of at least τ . We may similarly define
the social welfare LP.
In Section 5 we show the following.
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Theorem 2. Let F be the family of multiflow instances (G,H) where G is any capacitated
supply graph and H is a single-sink commodity graph. Then there is a polytime algorithm
which given an instance in F , produces a core vector which simultaneously achieves the
optimal LP fairness and LP social welfare.
This exact result is in contrast to the single-sink setting where agents pay for edges used
to carry traffic for single-sink flows (that is minimum spanning tree cost sharing games)
[GST04].
Unfortunately, for general demands - and even for line graphs - we are doomed to fail
with this approach. Consider P4 with unit capacity nodes. We also have two unit demand
commodities: 14, 23. One easily deduces that the only core vector is obtained by the flow
which routes 1 unit of demand for 23. Hence, the fairness is 0 for any core vector but the
fairness LP achieves 1/2.
One can however balance these objectives if approximate core solutions are allowed –
see Section 1.6.
Theorem 3. Consider a family of multiflow games for which we have a core-producing
algorithm. Consider an instance for which the fairness is at least τ . For any λ ∈ (0, 1) we
can compute a 11−λ -approximate core vector with fairness at least λτ .
We state this here in terms of the multiflow game, but the theorem holds much more
generally. We prove the general case in Section 5.
1.5 Related Work
The Multicommodity Flow Game was originally introduced by Papadimitriou to model
incentives in internet routing [Pap01]. In this model each node or player represents an
autonomous system (AS). Each AS is a component of the internet administrated (usually)
by a single operator, such as a university or corporation. The assumption is that each
AS desires to route as much of traffic originating from its users as possible. On the other
hand ASs must cooperate with each other to allow their customers access to the broader
network.
One difficulty is that the core may not a exist. Scarf however offers a sufficient condition
for the core to be non-empty. To introduce this we first define balanced collections. A
collection of coalitions T ⊆ P(V ) is balanced if there exists weights wS such that for every
player i,
∑
S3iwS = 1. If all weights are in {0, 1}, then this is exactly a partition of V . We
say that a payoff pi is attainable by S if pi ∈ Π(S). A game is balanced if for all balanced
collections T , if piS is attainable for all S ∈ T , then pi is attainable for the grand coalition.
Scarf’s theorem says that every balanced game has a non-empty core [Sca67].
Markakis and Saberi [MS05] show that the (NTU or TU) Multicommodity Flow Game
is balanced and thus has a non-empty core. In fact as every sub-game of a multiflow game is
still another multi-flow game, this result shows that these games are totally balanced. This
leads to a method for finding a core vector in the TU case only (from a construction based
on LP duality). For the NTU multicommodity flow game, the only efficient algorithm for
computing a core vector is the algorithm due to Yamada and Karasawa [YK06], denoted
earlier by yk.
1.6 Notation and Basics
We say a payoff vector pi ∈ Π(N) is in the (1+)-core of a game, if there is no proper subset
S and pi′ ∈ Π(S) such that pi′ S (1 + )pi. We refer to a game as downwards-closed if for
each S, Π(S) is a downwards-closed polytope in RN≥0. The following is straightforward.
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Lemma 1. Let Γ be a downwards-closed game and Γ′ be the game where Π′(S) = { 11+pi :
pi ∈ Π(S)}. Then any core vector in Γ′ is a (1 + )-approximate core vector for Γ.
For most of the technical parts we work with a feasible flow f with induced payoff
vector pi. We call a node tight if all of its capacity is used up by the flow f . We say
commodity is fully-routed if the demand constraint is satisfied with equality. If fP > 0 we
refer to P as a positive flow path. We say that a path P touches the node v if v ∈ V (P ).
We say P transits a node v if v ∈ I(P ), where I(P ) denotes the internal nodes of P . A
commodity k` is called positive if some flow is routed between k and `.
Recall that the flows from incorporate follow a nested ordering. Formally, this
means that if P is a subpath of Q, then the algorithm would attempt to route on P before
routing on Q (assuming both paths are associated with a commodity). It is helpful to
summarize properties of such nested flows in path supply graphs.
Lemma 2. If fk` > 0, then fij = dij, for all [i, j] ⊂ [k, `]
Proof. If fk` > 0, then prior to this commodity being routed, Cv > 0 ∀v ∈ [k, `]. Because
all commodities ij such that [i, j] ⊂ [k, `] are processed prior to fk`, we must have had
Cv > 0 for every v ∈ [i, j] when ij is routed.
Lemma 3. If fk` < dk`, then fij = 0, for all [i, j] ⊃ [k, `]
Proof. If fk` < dk`, then there is a tight node x ∈ [k, `] after k` is processed. Since any
commodity [i, j] ⊃ [k, `] is processed later, x will block ij from routing any flow.
2 Certifying that S is not a Breakaway Set in General Graphs
Let fˆ be some feasible flow with payoff pi. How can we check if pi is in the core? Let
us consider a more restricted question. For a given set S, can we verify that it has no
deviation? That is, can we certify that there is no flow f ∈ FS such that piS(f) > piS(fˆ)?
The existence of such a deviation corresponds to feasibility of the following strict-inequality
linear program.
maximize 0T f
subject to
∑
P3v
fP ≤ cv v ∈ S∑
P∈Pk`[S]
fP ≤ dk` k` ∈ H[S]
piv
(
f
)
> piv
(
fˆ
)
v ∈ S
fP ≥ 0, P ∈ P[S]
(1)
Here we use H[S] to denote the subgraph of H induced by S and P[S],Pk`[S] denote
simple paths in G[S].
To show that S does not have a deviation f , we must show that the above linear
program is infeasible. By Farkas’ Lemma, a linear system Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0 is infeasible if
and only if ∃y ≥ 0 such that yTA ≥ 0 and yT b < 0. This would immediately give a
way to show that a coalition S is not a breakaway, but for the fact that (1) has strict
inequalities. Hence, for some  > 0, consider a standard LP, call it LP (), obtained by
modifying the payoff constraints to be: −pix
(
f
) ≤ −pix(fˆ)− . We may now apply Farkas’
Lemma to this new program to see that it is infeasible if and only if there is a solution
(yx : x ∈ S), (zk` : k` ∈ E(H)), (wx : x ∈ S) to the following system.
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∑
v∈S
yvcv +
∑
k`∈H[S]
zk`dk` <
∑
v∈S
wv(piv
(
fˆ
)
+ ) (2)
∑
v∈V (P )
yv + zk` ≥ wk + w` ∀P ∈ Pk`[S], k` ∈ H[S] (3)
y, z, w ≥ 0 (4)
where we use that if P ∈ Pk`, then fP only contributes to the payoffs pik and pi`.
These facts are used to prove the following.
Lemma 4. S does not have a deviation if and only if there exists y, z, w ≥ 0 which satisfy
(3, 4) and ∑
v∈S
yvcv +
∑
k`∈E(H[S])
zk`dk` ≤
∑
v∈S
wvpiv
(
fˆ
)
(5)
and such that w 6= 0.
Proof. Note that S does not have a deviation if and only if LP () is infeasible for any
 > 0. First suppose that y, z, w satisfy the prescribed conditions. Since wx > 0 for some
x, we then have that the strict inequality holds (2), for any choice of  > 0. That is,
LP () is infeasible for any  > 0. Conversely, if S does not have a deviation, then LP (1) is
infeasible and hence there is an associated dual certificate y, z, w. Since the left-hand side
of (2) is non-negative, and pi
(
fˆ
) ≥ 0, we must have that wx > 0 for some x ∈ S.
We call a feasible solution y, z, w 6= 0 to (3-5) a (Farkas) certificate for a coalition S as
it certifies that S is not a breakaway set. We call such a coalition certifiable. To establish
that some vector is in the core, we must argue that any proper subset S is certifiable.
Later, we also need the following fact.
Lemma 5. If a coalition S is certifiable for a given payoff pi
(
fˆ
)
, then S is certifiable for
any payoff arising from a flow f ∈ FV such that f ≥ fˆ .
Proof. Clearly payoffs are monotonic with regard to flow, and the payoffs only occur in
constraint (5). As increasing the payoff can only improve this constraint, S is still certifiable
under f .
2.1 Implied Values and Trivial Cases
We continue to work on the case for general supply graphs G. For the remainder of this
section we assume that we are given a payoff vector pi (and a flow f which induces it) and
a proper subset S and our goal is to certify that S is not a breakaway set. We first restrict
attention to certificates with a simpler structure. We then consider several cases where it
is easy to certify S.
Given vectors y, w ≥ 0 we can easily determine if there is a z for which y, z, w is a
certificate. This is because the “best” choice of z is for each k` ∈ H[S], to set
zk` := Zk`(y, w) = max
P∈Pk`
{
wk + w` −
∑
v∈V (P )
yv, 0
}
. (6)
We refer to Zk`(y, w) as the value implied by y, w. This is the best value since zk`
only occurs in 2 constraints: in (3) where it needs to be at least the implied value, and (5)
where making it smaller improves the inequality.
Lemma 6. If y, z, w is a certificate, then so is y, z′, w where z′ is set to the values implied
by y, w.
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From now on, we assume that z is set to the implied values. Hence we only need to check
condition (5).
We will only consider binary certificates, that is, the vectors y, w are binary. We always
work with certificates where the support of y, denoted by Y , are tight nodes. Moreover,
we always select certificates so that Y ⊆W , where W is the support of w.
We now catalogue a few cases where certificates are trivial to construct.
We call a node v globally content if piv = cv. We hardly need a certificate to show that
no feasible flow (for any coalition S!) could yield strictly greater utility for v. Nevertheless
we construct a certificate as a warm-up for later results.
Lemma 7. If there exists a globally content player v ∈ S, then S is certifiable.
Proof. We construct the certificate as {v} = Y = W . Note that the right hand side of
(3) is only non-zero for demands which terminate at v. For such demands yv = 1 already
handles this constraint. Then the implied values are z = 0.
Now for condition (5) we have
yc+ zd = cv
= piv
= wpi
We now assume there are no globally content players and hence:
Assumption 1. Every tight player in S transits some flow.
If there exists v ∈ S such that piv ≥
∑
u∈S duv, then no feasible flow from FS can route
more flow to v. We say that such a player v is S-content.
Lemma 8. If there exists an S-content player, then S is certifiable
Proof. We set wv = 1 and y = 0. Hence the implied values are zkv = 1 for all commodities
kv ∈ H[S].
Again we check condition (5).
yc+ zd = zd
=
∑
kv∈H[S]
dkv
=
∑
kv∈H[S]
fkv
≤
∑
k 6=v
fkv
= piv
= wpi
Where the second equality follows from z only selecting commodities incident v, and
the third equality follows as every commodity (from H[S]) incident v is fully-routed (i.e.
dkv = fkv).
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Henceforth we assume the following.
Assumption 2. Every player in S must be incident to a commodity within H[S] that is
not fully-routed.
Note that if there are no tight nodes in S, then every player in S is S-content. Hence
we assume the following.
Assumption 3. The coalition S contains a tight node.
2.2 Pre-Certificates
We continue to work in general supply graphs. In this section we prove a key lemma for
building certificates based on two sets of nodes Y ⊆ W ⊆ S, where Y is a set of tight
nodes. We call this pair a pre-certificate if the vectors y = 1Y , w = 1W can be extended
to a certificate by setting a vector z to the implied values (6).
We say the variables y, z, w select some node capacities, demands, and node utilities
respectively. We then think of the selected demands and capacities as costs that need to be
charged against the selected utilities, i.e., to verify the condition (5) that wpi−(yc+zd) ≥ 0.
In other words, a charging scheme consists of paying for the selected capacities yc and de-
mands zd by using the payoffs from the selected players wpi.
We now develop sufficient conditions for sets Y,W to be a pre-certificate.
Lemma 9 (Pre-Certificate Lemma). Consider a pair of node sets Y ⊆W ⊆ S where nodes
in Y are tight. This forms a pre-certificate if the following properties hold:
P1) every commodity with both endpoints in W is fully-routed.
P2) every positive flow path that transits a player v ∈ Y has an endpoint in W
P3) if ab is a non-fully-routed commodity with an endpoint in W , then G \ Y does not
contain an ab-path
P4) no positive flow path touches more than one node in Y .
Proof. We let y = 1Y , w = 1W . For each k` ∈ H[S], we define W (k, `) := wk + w` and
so the implied values for z (6) are given by zk` = maxP∈Pk`
{
W (k, `) − y(P ), 0
}
; where
y(P ) =
∑
v∈V (P ) yv. It follows that zk` ∈ {0, 1, 2}. We claim that if zk` > 0, then k`
is fully-routed. Since if W (k, `) = 2, this follows from P1. Otherwise W (k, `) = 1 and
y(P ) = 0 for some k` path, but this violates P3, a contradiction.
It now remains to verify (5). We do this by a charging argument. First, we charge demands
selected by z to utilities of certain chosen players in W \ Y .
Case 1) zk` = 2:
Then W (k, `) = 2, and in fact some k`-path does not touch any node of Y . By
P1, k` is fully-routed and we charge this "twice selected" commodity against
both endpoints, each endpoint being charged dk`.
Case 2) zk` = 1:
There are two subcases, either W (k, `) = 1 or W (k, `) = 2.
Case 2.1) zk` = 1 and W (k, `) = 1:
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We must have that some k`-path does not touch any node in Y . P3
thus ensures that any such commodity is fully-routed, and we charge
the zk`dk` to the unique endpoint in W .
Case 2.2) zk` = 1 and W (k, `) = 2:
By definition of zk`, there is some k`-path which touches precisely
one node in Y . If that node is in {k, `}, then we charge the demand
zk`dk` to the utility of its endpoint not in Y . Otherwise k` transits
a node in Y (and P1 ensures k` is fully-routed). In this case we
arbitrarily charge one endpoint k or `.
We have now charged off zd and turn to the matter of charging the quantity yc to the
remaining (uncharged) utility from wpi. To this end, notice that the demands considered
in Case 2.2) contribute utility to two nodes in W but we have charged its quantity zk`dk`
to one of them. Hence we can still charge to the other endpoint in W . A similar situation
occurs for fully-routed commodities k` for which zk` = 0 if neither endpoint is in Y . Then
W (k, `) = 1 since if W (k, `) = 2, property P4 ensures that zk` > 0. Hence we did not
yet charge the utility from the selected endpoint in W . We denote the total such surplus
utility from these two situations by s.
Let’s classify the uncharged utilities. First, we have only charged players in W \Y so piv is
available from each v ∈ Y . Second, since zk` > 0 only for fully-routed demands, we have
not yet charged any utility accrued from non-fully-routed commodities. Third, we have
not charged the utility generated from external demands (that is demands with one end
point not in S) on (up to) one endpoint in W . Finally, as just noted we sometimes have
surplus utility s associated with one of the endpoints of a fully-routed demand. For each
of these three types of excess utility we denote the total available as follows: s (for fully-
routed commodities as defined above), σ (from positive but non-fully-routed commodities),
e (from external commodities) and
∑
v∈Y piv (from players in Y ). Thus the total utility
available to charge off yc is
wpi − zd ≥ s+ σ + e+
∑
v∈Y
piv. (7)
We must now charge the quantity yc to these surplus utilities. Since any positive com-
modity touches at most one node of Y (by P4) we consider each node v ∈ Y separately
when considering how to charge for its quantity yvcv = cv. This quantity arises in two
ways: from flow paths that terminate at v or flow paths that transit v. We charge the
capacity used by flows terminating at v to piv itself. For the remaining capacity we have
by P2 that any such transiting flow path has at least one endpoint in W . First, if this is
a non-fully-routed commodity, we charge its flow to the unique endpoint in W ; hence we
are charging utility which contributed to σ. Otherwise, it is a transiting flow path for a
fully-routed commodity k`. Either zk` = 0 or W (k, `) = 2 since commodities from Case
2.1) do not transit (or even touch) any nodes in Y . In both cases this capacity contributed
to the surplus s of utility from fully-routed commodities. Hence, there is an endpoint in
W which has available utility to charge.
Combining these observations we deduce that
yc ≤ s+ σ +
∑
v∈Y
piv.
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This together with (7) yields
wpi − zd− yc ≥ e ≥ 0
and hence the implied certificate y, z, w satisfies (5).
3 Path Certificates and Proof of Main Theorem
In the remainder of this section, we assume our supply graph is a path Pn. We also have
that f is some output from the algorithm incorporate. We show how to certify a given
breakaway set S. That is, we prove that there exists y, z, w which satisfy (3,4,5). Without
loss of generality S is of the form S = [i, j] for some i < j. From now on we also make the
assumptions (1-3) from Section 2.1.
We first eliminate the possibility of positive flow paths which span the interval [i, j].
Lemma 10. If there is a positive commodity k` such that S = [i, j] ⊆ [k, `], then S is
certifiable.
Proof. If such a commodity exists and k` 6= ij, then by Lemma 2, every commodity in
H[S] is fully-routed. But then every player in S is S-content, contradicting Assumption 2.
If k` = ij, then every node in (i, j) would be S-content as well. Since there is no S-content
node, this only leaves the case j = i + 1. We must have i(i + 1) is not fully-routed or
else both i and j would be S-content. But then since f was produced via a nested order,
i(i+1) was routed and blocked before any demands which transit through either i or i+1.
It follows that one of i or i + 1 hit capacity only by commodities which terminate at it.
Hence it is globally content, contradicting Assumption 1.
k i j `
> 0
=
Figure 3: Configuration of Lemma 10.
3.1 Anchor Sets for Paths
We define the anchors of a node v as A(v) = {k ∈ V : ∃P ∈ Pk`, f(P ) > 0, v ∈ I(P )}.
In other words, if there is a positive flow path which transits v, then the endpoints of the
path are anchors of v. Given a coalition S we refer to any positive commodity with exactly
one end point in S as an external commodity.
We further refine our notion of anchors for paths. For a given node v we split its
anchors into disjoints sets of left and right anchors. The left anchors are L(v) = {u ∈ V :
u ∈ A(v), u < v} and right anchors R(v) = {u ∈ V : u ∈ A(v), v < u}. We define the left
(resp. right) anchor sets for a player v as Y = {v}, and W = L(v) ∪ {v}. (resp. Y = {v},
and W = R(v) ∪ {v}).
Lemma 11. In this lemma we assume only that f is a nested flow on the path G. The left
(resp. right) anchor sets of a tight node v ∈ S is a pre-certificate as long as the following
conditions hold:
PA) L(v) ⊆ S (resp. R(v) ⊆ S)
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L′ i v ` j
Figure 4: The configuration disallowed by PA
i a L′ b v j
<
Figure 5: A non-fully-routed demand disallowed by PB
PB) there is no non-fully-routed commodity ab such that b ∈ L(v) and a ∈ [i, L′) – see
Figure 3.1 (resp. a ∈ R(v) and b ∈ (R′, j]).
Here L′ is the leftmost anchor of v (resp. R′ is the rightmost anchor of v).
Proof. It is sufficient to show that if the anchor sets Y = {v},W = L(v) ∪ Y satisfy
properties PA and PB, then they satisfy all properties from the Pre-Certificate Lemma 9.
First, note that by PA we have W ⊆ S as required.
P1) Observe thatW is a subset of [L′, v] where L′ is the leftmost anchor. Any commodity
with both endpoints inW is thus nested under a positive commodity that terminates
at L′ and some node to the right of v. Hence by Lemma 2 it is fully-routed.
P2) For any positive commodity that transits v, its left endpoint is an anchor of v, and
L(v) ⊆W .
P3) Suppose that ab is a non-fully-routed commodity with an endpoint inW but does not
transit or terminate at v. By Lemma 2, we must have a < L′ or else it is fully-routed.
But this possibility is disallowed by PB.
P4) This follows trivially as |Y | = 1.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Recall by Assumption 3, S contains at least one tight node.
Lemma 12. If v is a leftmost tight node in S, then there does not exist any non-fully-routed
commodity ab such that [a, b] ⊆ [i, v) (resp. a similar statement holds for rightmost).
Proof. Suppose such a commodity ab exists. Then v is a left most tight node so there are
no tight nodes in [i, v). No player could have blocked ab so it was not maximally routed,
a contradiction.
Let X ⊆ V (G) = [n]. We say X has been processed by the algorithm if each element of
X has been incorporated. The time of processing X refers to the first time in the execution
after which all elements are processed.
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Lemma 13. Let fˆ be the current flow at the time of processing {i, j}. Then [i, j] is
certifiable under the flow fˆ .
Proof. Without loss of generality, let i be the last of i, j to be incorporated. By Assump-
tion 3 there must be at least one tight node in [i, j] or else it is certifiable. So let v be a
leftmost tight node.
We now show that the left anchor sets of v form a pre-certificate using Lemma 11.
PA) Since player i has just been incorporated, no commodity with an endpoint farther
left than i has been routed. Hence L(v) ⊂ [i, j].
PB) As v is a leftmost tight node we can apply Lemma 12.
Hence [i, j] is indeed certifiable by Lemma 11.
Lemma 14. If f is a flow returned by the algorithm incorporate, then pi(f) is in the
core.
Proof. The last pair to be processed by the algorithm is {1, n} and all pairs have been
considered prior. By Lemma 13 after a pair {k, `} is processed, the corresponding subset
[k, `] was certifiable for the current flow at that time. By Lemma 5 after adding more flow
each set remains certifiable. Thus every coalition of contiguous players is certifiable for f ,
and pi(f) must be in the core.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. We now extend these ideas to handle spiders.
Corollary 1. Let Tc be the class of trees (so-called spiders) with at most 1 node of degree
greater than two. There is a polytime algorithm for producing core elements for any multi-
flow game associated with a tree in Tc.
A spider is a connected graph where every node except for one has degree at most
two, we call this distinguished node the root of the spider, and the paths connected to it
the legs of the spider. We will consider orienting the spider with the root on the left, and
each leg leading to the right so as to easily allow us to re-use the terminology from paths.
We now adapt our methods on the path to find core elements when the supply graph is a
spider. We consider a modified instance where all demands between legs of the spider are
removed. That is, any commodity of form uv where neither u or v is the root and u and
v are on different legs. In particular each such commodity transits the root. We then run
incorporate starting at the root.
Lemma 15. If Incorporate starts from the root on the modified spider, then it returns
a core element for the original game.
Proof. Consider a (contiguous) coalition S that does not contain the root r, then the flow
returned is the same as if we simply ran incorporate on the leg that contains S starting
at the root, and by our results on the path S is certifiable.
Consider a coalition S that does contain the root. We can then consider each leg `i of
the spider individually. Let ti be the rightmost node of `i contained in S, then similarly to
Lemma 13 we look at the flow fˆ at the time of processing {r, ti}. If there are any nodes in
`i that are tight under fˆ then there is a rightmost tight node and a right anchor certificate.
If no leg has a right anchor certificate, then there are no tight nodes to block the flow from
r and r must be S-content. Hence by Lemma 8 S is certifiable.
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After we find a flow in the core for the modified instance we can add back the removed
commodities and route them arbitrarily.
Note we can view any path as a spider with two (potentially empty) legs with any node
playing the role of the root. This gives us access to more valid orderings and potentially
more core elements.
4 The Empirical Core
We now have an algorithm that can potentially create a different core element for each
order in which players are incorporated. In this we investigate the diversity of core elements
generated by running incorporate multiple times with a random incorporation ordering.
We refer to the set of core elements obtained as the empirical core or ECore of a given
game.
Since games (both cooperative and non-cooperative) may have many stable solutions,
it is interesting and important to compare relative merits associated with them. It is
natural to view this as a multi-objective decision process where the two most common
social choice metrics are social welfare (SW) and fairness. The social welfare of a payoff
is the sum individual payoffs SW (pi) =
∑
v∈V piv, and the fairness is the minimum payoff
of any player Fair(pi) = minv∈V piv. Maximizing social welfare is desirable because it
maximizes efficiency, whereas maximizing fairness appeals to notions of distributive justice
(sometimes know as equity). Since all core elements are stable payoffs, our main question
can be summarized as "What is the impact of stability on efficiency and fairness?"
We next describe the different classes of games whose empirical cores we investigate.
4.1 Game Models
Recall that an instance of a multicommodity flow game on the path is defined by the
number of players, their capacities, and the demand graph with its edge weights. Each
family of games is defined by a game model denoted M(n,C,D) where n,C,D are three
real-valued parameters; n denotes the number of players and C,D are values which govern
the choice of capacity and demand vectors. Each model comes with a method or experiment
for generating capacities and demands based on the parameters C,D, n. Intuitively, C,D
are used to define how competitive the games are. When capacities are high and demands
relatively low, there is little competition and players can route more or less freely. Whereas
when capacities are low and demands are high, we say there is high competition on the
network.
4.1.1 Constant Model
The constant model is extremely simple. This model deterministically returns a game
where every player v has capacity cv = C, and every pair of players uv has demand
duv = D.
4.1.2 Gaussian Marginal Model
In this model we generate marginal demands dv =
∑
u6=v duv for each player v according
to a distribution described below. Each player’s capacity is then set to be cv = Cdv. To
generate the demands we draw D pairs u, v using a truncated normal distribution (for a
formal definition see A)
For each pair drawn from the distribution we round them both to the nearest integers
u, v. For each such pair u, v we increment duv.
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4.1.3 Random Graph Model
In this model each capacity is drawn uniformly at random from the interval [1, C]. The
demand graph is generated from an Erdös-Renyi random graph model where every edge
is included independently with probability a half. Each edge weight duv is then drawn
uniformly from the interval [1, D].
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Constant Model Results
In this section we fix the number of players n = 50 and the constant demand D = 1. We
then generate multiple games as we let the amount of capacity rise. Eventually as capacity
is abundant enough all demands can be routed and the core consists of a single payoff.
Clearly, when C = 0 and there is no capacity the only feasible flow is the zero flow, and
consequently the core must also be this single point.
We first examine how the number of distinct core elements (size of the Ecore) changes
as the capacity increases (competitiveness decreases). These results are show in Figure
6. There are 2
∑n−1
2
i=1
(
n−(i+2)
i−1
)
different incorporation orderings, or for n = 50 there are
9,615,053,952 different orderings. We however only generate a tiny fraction of this amount.
Figure 6: Number of (distinct) Elements in ECore for Constant Model, 2000 samples per
game
Next, we examine the same games from the perspective of social welfare. Each game is
determined by the parameter C and for each game we consider 2000 random incorporation
orderings. In Figure 7 we plot the minimum, average, and maximum social welfare over the
empirical core for each C. We also compare these to the maximum possible SW (denoted
Optimal SW) which is obtained by solving a multicommodity flow problem. Note that the
curves for the maximum SW over the empirical core is occluded by the curve Optimal SW.
The take-away message from Figure 7 appears to be that for the constant model, core
elements essentially maximize social welfare. Even our minimum sampled core elements
achieves 93% of the maximum social welfare. Conversely, it is natural to ask if solving the
Optimal SW LP always produces a core element. This is false as the example of Figure 2
is a basic optimal solution to the SW LP, but it is not in the core.
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We next examine how effective the empirical core is in terms of fairness.
Figure 7: Social Welfare of ECore for Constant Model, 2000 samples per game
Figure 8 shows the minimum, average, and maximum fairness over the same family
of empirical cores. Since optimal fairness (not necessarily for core payouts) can again
be computed by an LP, we include this in our comparison. The message here is quite
different. First, even the maximum ECore fairness is generally quite far (factor 2) from the
optimal fairness. Second, the ratio between the maximum ECore fairness to the average
and minimum ECore fairness is substantial.
Figure 8: Fairness of ECore for Constant Model, 2000 samples per game
4.2.2 Gaussian Marginals Model Results
We repeat the above experiments for the Gaussian Marginal Model in Figures 9, 10, and
11. Again in Figure 10 the maximum core social welfare is the same as the optimal social
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welfare.
Figure 9: Number of Elements in ECore for Gaussian Marginals Model, 2000 samples per
game
Figure 10: Social Welfare of ECore for Gaussian Marginals Model, 2000 samples per game
18
Figure 11: Fairness of ECore for Gaussian Marginals Model, 2000 samples per game
4.2.3 Effect of Incorporation Time on Payoff
In this section we investigate whether there is a benefit for individual players based on
the time at which they are incorporated. It is natural to suppose that members would
either wish to join the coalition either strictly earlier or strictly later. As we will see this is
not the case. Given that a player’s payoff depends not only on the time they were added,
but also the order in which the other players are added, we investigate all players’ average
payoffs over the different incorporation orderings.
In Figure 12 we see this plotted for a constant model game (n = 50, C = 250).
The most notable feature is that nearly all of the mass is concentrated to the two main
diagonals. In other words, it seems on average that if a player is located at position i,
they do best if they are added near time i or time n − i, with a bias towards the later
time. This characteristic "X" shape is present in all the models we tested including the
random graph model. While we can observe "spikes" along the main diagonals, these are
an artifact of the capacity parameter and not intrinsic to the players’ position/their time
of incorporation.
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Figure 12: Player’s Average Payoff by Time Incorporated, 5000 samples, x=players posi-
tion, y=time incorporated, z=average payoff
5 Fairness versus Social Welfare
In this section we examine the fairness-social welfare tradeoff in more detail. We start
by showing that for single-sink instances, we can balance these performance objectives
perfectly.
Theorem 2. Let F be the family of multiflow instances (G,H) where G is any capacitated
supply graph and H is a single-sink commodity graph. Then there is a polytime algorithm
which given an instance in F , produces a core vector which simultaneously achieves the
maximum social welfare and maximum fairness.
Proof. We call x ∈ R[k]≥0 a routable vector if there is a feasible flow which routes xi units from
each terminal si. As observed in Section 1.4 a flow induces a core element if it maximizes∑
xi. We next observe that P = {x ∈ R[k]≥0 : x is a routable vector} is a polymatroid (cf.
[Sch03]). As such the greedy algorithm always produces a maximum flow. In other words,
we may greedily process the terminals si in any order. At each step, we route additional
flow from si without reducing flow from previously processed terminals (using a standard
Ford-Fulkerson Flow algorithm, this may require re-routing paths). We may perform this
process so that terminals are visited more than once, if in earlier iterations we do not “max
out” the flow from a terminal.
Obviously this algorithm could lead to a maximum flow where many terminals route
0 (xi = 0). Hence (as with our experiments on the line) many of the maximum flows
x ∈ P will be core elements which perform poorly in terms of fairness. This can be fixed
by adding a parameter τ which is a fairness target; we can later do binary search on τ . We
run a first throttled phase of the greedy algorithm where we do not increase any xi above τ .
If this results in a flow vector with some xi < τ , then we selected τ too large for fairness.
Otherwise, we perform a second greedy pass of the terminals. This increases some of the
flows and is guaranteed to produce a maximum flow (by polymatroidality) and hence a
core vector with fairness ≥ τ .
The proof suggests a natural way to induce fairness out of any core-producing al-
gorithm. Run a throttle phase to guarantee fairness, and then run a second phase which
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produces a core vector with large social welfare. Unfortunately, the P4 example (Section 4)
shows that this fails even for the multiflow game. Instead we relax the target of producing
a core vector. We only require a vector in the approximate core, or equivalently, a core
vector in the game where capacities are scaled down uniformly.
In the following we let LPsw and LPfair denote the LPs which maximize social wel-
fare/fairness for the set of feasible payoff vectors in a given game.
.
Theorem 3. Consider a core-producing algorithm for a family of downwards closed games.
Consider an instance for which LPfair ≥ τ . For any λ ∈ (0, 1) we can compute a 11−λ -
approximate core vector with fairness at least λτ .
Proof. We run the given algorithm for the instance scaled down by (1−λ). It follows from
Lemma 1 that the output pi(1) is in the 11−λ -approximate core. By assumption, there exists
pi(2) ∈ Π(N) such that Fair(pi(2)) ≥ τ . Thus (by downwards-closed) pi = pi(1) + λpi(2) ∈
Π(N). We also have that pi ≥ pi(2) and hence the same reasoning used in Lemma 5 implies
that pi is again in the approximate core.
6 Conclusion
We have provided an efficient algorithm for generating multiple core elements when the
transit network is a path or spider. We have shown while there appears to be little trade-off
between efficiency and stability, there is a trade-off between stability and fairness. Our
theoretical results are based on certifying that a coalition has no deviation in general
graphs. We hope this may be useful in the challenging problem of computing core vectors
for general instances. Another interesting direction, motivated by inter-domain routing
behaviours, is to consider games with penalties/taxations for transiting traffic [SW05].
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A Truncated Normal Distribution
Let N(µ, σ) be a normal distribution. Let φ(x) = 1√
2pi
exp
( − 12x2), and Φ(x) = 12(1 +
erf(x/
√
2
)
be the probability density function and cumulative distribution function for the
standard normal distribution respectively. Then a truncated normal distribution with a
lower bound of L and an upper bound of U has the following probability density function:
f(x) =
φ
(x−µ
σ
)
σ
(
Φ
(U−µ
σ
)− Φ(L−µσ ))
For our model we choose µ = n2 , σ = 2
√
n, and L = 1, U = n.
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